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The Individual Right to
Asylum Under Article 3




In a series of decisions beginning in 1961, the European Commission of
Human Rights I has recognized a limited right of asylum under the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights 2 for persons subject to deportation or
extradition proceedings in countries party to the Convention. This devel-
opment is remarkable because, as the Commission itself recognizes, "the
right to political asylum is not as such included among the rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the Convention." 3 The Commission found the
basis for a right of nondeportation in Article 3 of the Convention, which
declares that "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment." Specifically, the Commission has
advanced the principle that a state party violates its Article 3 obligations
when it returns an alien to a country where he or she might be subjected
to treatment which, if inflicted by a party to the Convention, would itself
constitute a violation of Article 3.4
International law does not recognize an individual right to be granted
asylum. 5 The emergence of a variant of such a right under the European
Convention on Human Rights, albeit under limited conditions, therefore
marks a major departure from customary law, a departure particularly
noteworthy given that the parties to the Convention represent some of the
most advanced legal systems in the world. The recognition of a right to
asylum not only establishes a valuable precedent, but also has a direct
impact on the status of refugees in Europe. Although no right of entry is
provided, aliens already in countries of refuge in Europe are now protected
from forced return to countries where their fundamental human rights
* Class of 1982, University of Michigan Law School.
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might be denied. To appreciate the significance of such a development, the
right recognized by the Commission, limited as it is, must be evaluated
with three objectives in mind: to examine how the doctrine evolved
through the decisions of the European Commission of Human Rights, to
isolate the substantive features of the doctrine, and finally to identify
limits to future applications of the doctrine. Before exploring the content
and ramifications of the asylum decisions of the Commission, however, it
is necessary to understand the role of the Commission in the enforcement
of the European Convention on Human Rights.
THE CONVENTION ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM
Two organs of the Council of Europe 6 were created by the Convention to
oversee enforcement of its provisions: the European Commission of
Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights. 7 Only the
Commission has as yet played any role in developing the doctrine of
nondeportation. The Commission is the "court of first resort," receiving
petitions alleging violations of the Convention directly from aggrieved
parties either states or individuals. 8 The Commission has the same number
of members as there are parties to the Convention; no two members may
be of the same nationality. 9 The Committee of Ministers of the Council
of Europe elects the members from a list drawn up by the Bureau of the
Consultative Assembly. 10
On receiving a petition alleging violations of the Convention, the Com-
mission's first task is to decide if it is admissible, that is, whether it is
eligible under the Convention for further consideration of its facts and the
claim it states. 11 Under Article 27(2), the Commission may reject an ap-
plication which it considers "manifestly ill-founded." 12 For example, a
petition is inadmissible if it claims a right not found in the Convention 
1 3
or if the facts do not indicate a violation of the Convention. 14 There is no
provision in the Convention for appeal of a finding of inadmissibility.
If an application is admitted, the Commission has broad powers to
investigate the claims it contains. The Convention requires the state ac-
cused of a violation to furnish all necessary information and to cooperate
with the Commission. 15 The avowed aim of the Commission is to help the
parties reach a friendly settlement "on the basis of respect for Human
Rights as defined in [the] Convention." 16 If it can do so, the Commission's
work is ended. 17 If not, the Commission will draw up a report stating
whether it believes the facts disclose a violation of the Convention. 18 It
will then transmit the report to the Committee of Ministers of the Council
of Europe, 19 along with any proposals it may have on the matter. 20 The
Commission may then leave to the Committee of Ministers the final deci-
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sion on whether there has been a breach, 2 1 or it may refer the case to the
European Court of Human Rights under Article 48.22 The Court renders
a final decision on all cases referred to it. 
23
Each party to the Convention has the right to submit petitions to the
Commission alleging violations by other parties. 24 More significantly, in-
dividuals too, may petition the Commission directly as provided in Article
25. The Commission may receive an individual application, however, only
if the state it is lodged against has accepted Article 25. The right of in-
dividual application, and the degree to which member states have volun-
tarily subscribed to it, may be considered both a sign of and a factor in the
Convention's success. 25 As of June 1979, fourteen of the twenty-one
member states had ratified Article 25.26 This provision for individual
petition stands in sharp contrast to customary, and most conventional,
international law, which does not recognize individuals as subjects. 27 Each
of the applications discussed below came before the Commission by in-
dividual petition.
Even if a state has not ratified Article 25, an individual may claim the
Convention's protection directly if the respondent state has incorporated
the Convention into its domestic law. This enables the individual to bring
suit in a municipal court to enforce his or her rights under the Convention,
in many ways a simpler procedure than petitioning the Commission. 28 At
present ten states have explicitly incorporated the Convention into
municipal law. 29 The effectiveness of the Convention is further enhanced
by Article 46, which allows any party to the Convention to declare that
it recognizes as compulsory the jurisdiction of the European Court of
Human Rights in all matters of application and interpretation of the Con-
vention. This declaration means that a state accepts the competence of the
Court to deal with any case alleging a violation of the Convention within
its territory. 30 At present sixteen states have ratified Article 46.31
EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF NONDEPORTATION
1961-1964: Establishing a Foundation
The Commission first recognized that deportation might constitute a viola-
tion of the Convention in its opinion on the application of Xcontra la Belgique
(1961). 32 The applicant, a Hungarian residing in Brussels, was considered
a menace to public order and was ordered by the Belgian police to leave
the country within thirty days. The applicant claimed that he was physi-
cally unable to leave because of recent surgery and that the taking of his
identification papers by the police would make it impossible for him to
settle elsewhere. He petitioned the Commission under Article 25, alleging
that deportation would violate his right under Article 3 of the Convention.
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The Commission refused to admit the application on the grounds that the
Belgian authorities had taken no further official action to deport the appli-
cant. In its discussion of the law, however, the Commission raised the
question of whether the expulsion of an alien could, under certain excep-
tional circumstances, constitute inhuman or degrading treatment within
the meaning of Article 3.33 The pronouncement was guarded; the Com-
mission merely implied that deportation could be a violation of Article 3.
Nonetheless, simply raising the question in this case influenced a series of
decisions by which the principle of nondeportation became Convention
law.
The next two decisions by the Commission on the admissibility of
petitions alleging violations of the Convention in the context of deporta-
tion or extradition restated the principle enunciated in X contra la Belgique.
In X against the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) (1962), 34 the Commission
affirmed that the legality of deportation could be scrutinized under Article
3. The FRG had threatened to return a Christian Egyptian citizen to Egypt
after his conviction in Germany for selling smuggled goods. The applicant
feared persecution in Egypt as a result of earlier pro-Jewish activities. He
did not allege that he would be subjected to political persecution, but
rather that the situation in Egypt under Nasser, which was strongly anti-
Israel, presented a danger to his life and liberty. 35 The Commission reject-
ed his application, but noted that the question of a violation of Article 3
might arise in connection with deportation to a particular country. 36 The
Commission refused to decide the issue because Germany had ceased its
efforts to deport the applicant.
The Commission's opinion in a second case of the same name elaborated
on the elements necessary to state a violation of Article 3. In X against the
Federal Republic of Germany (1962) 37 the respondent-state desired to return a
former Turkish citizen to Turkey, which had requested his extradition on
charges of forgery, fraud, illegal currency transactions, and espionage. The
applicant denied these charges, and claimed that the new government in
Turkey wanted to punish him for his acts on behalf of the former Men-
deres regime. 38 The Commission held that the question of a violation of
Article 3 might arise when a person was to be returned "to a particular
country in which, due to the very nature of the regime of that country or
to a particular situation in that country, basic human rights ... might be
either grossly violated or entirely suppressed." 3 9 Without elaborating
upon the reasons for its conclusion, the Commission declared that these
conditions were not fulfilled in the instant case. 40
In deciding the admissibility of the petition of X against Austria and
Yugoslavia (1964), 41 the Commission stated more explicitly the doctrine it
was applying to extradition and deportation cases. The applicant alleged
a violation of Article 3 by Austria, which had agreed to extradite him to
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Yugoslavia to face charges of embezzlement. The applicant argued that the
Yugoslav charges against him were politically motivated as a result of his
known opposition to the Tito government and alleged that, should he
return to Yugoslavia, he would face severe and inhuman reprisal. He
admitted that he had embezzled an amount of money from his enterprise,
although much less than the Yugoslavs claimed. 42 The Austrian authori-
ties maintained that he was a common fugitive from justice. 43 While
maintaining that extradition could constitute inhuman or degrading treat-
ment in violation of Article 3 in exceptional cases, the Commission found
that Austrian judicial procedure in extradition cases which here resulted
in a denial of political asylum, contained sufficient procedural safeguards
to preclude the possibility of a violation of Article 3.44 The petition was
dismissed.
The Commission expressed the rationale underlying the application of
Article 3 to extradition and deportation cases as follows:
[A]lthough extradition and the right of asylum are not, as such, among the
matters governed by the Convention ... the Contracting States have never-
theless accepted to restrict the free exercise of their powers under general
international law, including the power to control the entry and exit of aliens, to the
extent and within the limits of the obligations which they have assumed
under the Convention. 45
By emphasizing that all sovereign powers are limited by the obligations
contained in the Convention, the Commission indicated that the right it
was expounding, although not expressly set out in the convention, was
nevertheless inherent in it. The enforcement of a limited right of asylum
in exceptional circumstances, therefore, is merely incidental to the Com-
mission's duty to protect the right under Article 3 not to be subjected to
inhuman or degrading treatment. The contracting states to the European
Convention on Human Rights entrusted the Commission with a primary
role in safeguarding the human rights of persons in Europe, whether na-
tionals of contracting parties or not. 46 If the Commission observes actions
taken in Europe that would have the result of depriving an individual of
his or her rights, it must intervene to stop such actions. Deportation or
extradition are actions which, in exceptional circumstances, could result in
a gross deprivation of human rights. The Commission may therefore en-
join the deportation or extradition, even though such actions do not consti-
tute immediate violations of the Convention, if their effect would be to
allow a later violation of the terms of the Convention, albeit by a state not
party to the Convention.
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Application and Reaffirmation of the Doctrine
Although the Commission stated as early as 1961 that deportation could
give rise to the question of a violation of Article 3, and by 1964 explained
the rationale underlying this principle, the doctrine was not actually ap-
plied until 1967. In that year the Commission admitted the application of
X against the Federal Republic of Germany (1967). 47 West Germany wished to
deport the applicant, an Algerian citizen, to Algeria. The applicant feared
grave harm should he be returned to Algeria because of his contacts with
the French Army during the Algerian Civil War. The Commission admit-
ted the case for further study, finding that the facts stated showed that
deportation might lead to inhuman treatment in violation of Article 3.48
During its investigation after admitting the case, however, the Commis-
sion discovered that the applicant had disappeared, and ordered the case
struck from its list. 49
The second case to be admitted was Amekrane against the United Kingdom
(1972). 50 The applicant's husband, a senior Moroccan Air Force officer, fled
to British Gibraltar after an unsuccessful attempt on the life of the King
of Morocco. 51 The Gibraltar authorities refused his request for political
asylum 5 2 and turned him over to the Moroccan officials in Gibraltar. 53 He
was tried by a military court and executed for treason in January 1973. In
her petition, his widow charged the UK with violating Article 3.54 She
alleged that the British authorities in Gibraltar had held her husband
incommunicado in a Gibraltar prison, that they had used subterfuge to
take him from the prison to turn him over to the Moroccans, and that at
the time he was so sick as to be endangered by the move. Ms. Amekrane
further charged that her husband had been tortured before his trial in
Morocco, and that the trial itself was a farce. She concluded by insisting
that the Gibraltar authorities were fully aware of the probable conse-
quences of their actions, and that their actions not only contravened the
municipal law of Gibraltar, but also Article 3 of the Convention. 55 The
British Government denied the allegations, and insisted that the authori-
ties in Gilbraltar had acted in complete conformity with municipal and
Convention law. 56 After examining the facts as submitted by the parties,
the Commission found sufficient evidence of a violation of the Convention
to warrant admission. 57 The Commission then helped the parties reach an
amicable settlement, under which the UK paid the applicant £37,500 while
maintaining that it had committed no violation. 58 The Commission there-
fore conducted no full investigation nor gave a formal recommendation on
the case.
In its opinions on admissibility since Amekrane, the Commission has
consistently stated that deportation can constitute a breach of Article 3,
although it has refused to admit most claims on their merits. 59 In X v1
LEGAL REMEDIES FOR REFUGEES 483
Federal Republic of Germany (1973), the Commission reemphasized that the
states parties had voluntarily restricted their powers of control over the
entry and exit of foreigners, and that this cession enabled the Commission
to hold deportation under some circumstances to be a violation of Article
3.60 West Germany had ordered an Algerian citizen expelled to France
after conviction for various ordinary criminal offenses. The Algerian feared
the French would then deport him to Algeria, where he faced a death
sentence for participation in an unsuccessful coup against the current
regime. In this instance, the Commission stated, deportation to Algeria
would constitute a violation of Article 3. Expulsion to France would not,
however, since the German Government could not be held responsible for
the actions of the French, and had indeed planned to send the French
Government a note expressing the assumption that the applicant would
not be deported to Algeria. 61 In X v/Federal Republic of Germany (1976), 62
which dealt with attempts by West Germany to deport a Jordanian citizen
after his conviction of a common criminal offense in Germany, the Com-
mission noted that it had consistently upheld the doctrine of nondeporta-
tion, although it rejected the application in the instant case due to factual
inconsistencies in the applicant's allegations. 63 And in the most recent case
to come before the Commission, M Giama v/Belgium (1980), 64 the Commis-
sion affirmed the principle once more, and admitted the application for
further investigation. After acceptance, however, the parties were able to
achieve a friendly settlement. 65
Contours of the Doctrine
The line of decisions starting with X contra la Belgique sets forth a two-
pronged test for determining if deportation or extradition contravenes
Article 3. The first and simplest element is that the applicant is to be
deported to a country known for its denial of human rights. 66 By deliber-
ately sending a person to a country where he or she clearly will be subject-
ed to inhuman or degrading treatment, the expelling state is committing
an act without which the subsequent ill-treatment would not be possible.
In a real sense, therefore, the deporting state is causing severe suffering to
the deportee, although it remains one step removed from the actual inflic-
tion of pain. In Xagainst the Federal Republic of Germany (1962), the Commission
placed special emphasis on the requirement that the receiving country be
a known human rights violator. 67 This indicates that the Commission
includes a scienter element in the Article 3 violation and will fault the
expelling state only if it had good reason to believe that the applicant
would be harmed upon deportation or extradition. The requisite knowl-
edge could come from the applicant's presentation of information to the
national authorities 68 or through independent knowledge on their part. 69
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The Commission has not directly addressed the question of whether there
could be a violation if the applicant could prove that deportation to a
country respecting human rights would be followed by expulsion to a state
where his or her rights might be suppressed. In X v/FederalRepublic of Germany
(1973), discussed above, the Commission raised the issues, but rejected the
application upon finding that the applicant had not established with cer-
tainty that the subsequent deportation would occur. 7
0
The second requirement is that the circumstances be "exceptional." 71
Although it has never defined precisely what it means by exceptional
circumstances, the Commission's examinations of fact situations have
focused on the existence of "serious reasons to believe that the person
concerned will be subjected, in the State to which he is to be sent, to
treatment which is in violation of this Article (3)." 72 Inhuman or degrading
treatment has been defined by the Commission as "such treatment as
deliberately causes severe suffering, mental or physical, which in the par-
ticular situation is unjustifiable." 73 The level of proof required of the
applicant has been quite high. 74 He or she is expected to furnish in detail
"the exact nature of the dangers which might threaten him in the event
of his deportation.. . .,,7 That the Commission demands a high degree of
proof may be seen from the fact that, of the twelve cases examined here,
only three were declared admissible.
The strict proof requirement reflects the Commission's acknowledge-
ment that deportation and extradition are normally permissible under the
Convention. The Commission has no desire to usurp this important aspect
of sovereignty and will interfere only in truly extraordinary circumstances
with a state's right to expel aliens from its territory.
Before admitting a petition, the Commission will weigh the facts as
submitted by the parties and to some extent probe the evidence behind
them; it need not accept the applicant's allegations as true. 76 The degree
to which it may reject as unfounded facts alleged by the applicant is
apparent in Becker against Denmark (1975). 77 The applicant sought to halt the
planned repatriation of approximately 200 Vietnamese war orphans from
Denmark to Vietnam after the end of the Vietnamese War. The orphans
had been evacuated from Vietnam in April 1975 pursuant to agreements
between the applicant and the Danish and South Vietnamese Govern-
ments which contemplated their return after the cessation of hostilities. 78
In support of his claim that the children would be subjected upon their
return to inhuman or degrading treatment because of their ethnic origin
(Montagnard) and their ties to the anti-Communist regime in the south,
the applicant presented extensive evidence of reprisals taken by the new
Vietnamese Government, evidence in the form of journalistic accounts and
letters from experts on Vietnamese affairs. 79 The Commission examined
the evidence, but declared the application inadmissible, choosing to be-
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lieve the Danish Government's assurances that the children would be
safe. 80
PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT
The application of Article 3 to deportation and extradition has been evolv-
ing over the past twenty years as outlined in the foregoing discussion. An
assessment of how far the doctrine of nondeportation might extend in the
future necessitates closer scrutiny of key components of the doctrine. The
doctrine applies when the applicant can prove that deportation or extradi-
tion to a specific state has a great likelihood of leading to inhuman treat-
ment. Two questions follow from this: what factors has the Commission
considered in evaluating the likelihood of inhuman treatment, and what
constitutes a breach of rights in the receiving state sufficient to make
deportation itself inhuman treatment?
The Commission has, in its opinions on the admissibility of various
applications, shed some light on these questions and their corollaries.
Deportation or extradition to a party to the Convention seems to be proof
that inhuman treatment will not occur. 81 The Commission has also held
that no inhuman or degrading treatment can occur if the state against
which the applicant seeks to enforce his or her rights has dropped any
further formal actions against the applicant. 82 Beyond this, the possibility
of an Article 3 violation depends on the specific circumstances of the case.
Among other things, the Commission will consider the efforts by the
returning state to ensure that the returnee will not be harmed. Factors that
may have a special impact are the government's use of individualized
screening procedures to decide on a case-by-case basis whether a returnee
faces a possible danger in returning to the receiving state, 8 3 and coopera-
tion by the government with international organizations such as the Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in arranging the
individual's return. 84
Although the Commission noted in Becker against Denmark, that "it is not
within the power of the respondent government to give guarantees as to
what should not happen to the children in South Vietnam," the Commis-
sion nevertheless placed great emphasis on the approval of the repatriation
agreement by the UNHCR, the availability of the UNHCR to offer finan-
cial support to the children through its Saigon office, and the negotiation
of special arrangements between the Danish Government and the Danish
and Vietnamese Red Cross Societies to follow up the reestablishment of
the children in their homeland. 85 In particular, it was noted that "it seems
to the Commission hardly probable that the High Commissariat would
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lend its assistance to a repatriation of the children if their fate were at
stake." 86
Defining what is inhuman or degrading treatment on the part of the
receiving state for purposes of the doctrine is more difficult. As noted
above, the standard definition of inhuman or degrading treatment is "such
treatment as deliberately causes severe suffering, mental or physical which,
in the particular situation, is unjustifiable." 87 The Commission has held
that certain practices are not inhuman treatment. Military conscription is
not inhuman, and so not ground for delaying deportation. 88 Nor is impris-
onment for nonpolitical crimes contrary to Article 3, as it is specifically
allowed under Article 5. The Commission has held that prosecution for
desertion is not political persecution. 89 In considering cases of extradition,
the Commission will take into account both the nature of the crime the
applicant is charged with and the practices of the receiving state. If the
receiving state respects the doctrine of speciality, 90 the Commission is
likely to allow extradition. 91
These holdings leave uncharted much of the field of inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment. Inhuman treatment may result in mental as well as physical
suffering, 92 but the quantum or quality of suffering required to establish
the violation is by no means clear. Incarceration under wretched condi-
tions, although it does not amount to torture, has been held to constitute
inhuman treatment. 93 Solitary confinement has never been found to do
so. 94 A harder problem is presented by the use of administrative machin-
ery for the harassment of a returnee. Persecution may occur directly or
obliquely, through such acts as denying the newly arrived deportee a good
job, adequate housing, or the chance to educate his or her children. That
such treatment may occur, however, is difficult to prove beforehand, and
the strict proof requirements developed by the Commission for nondepor-
tation cases compounds the difficulty.
The Commission has consistently required the applicant to prove that
he or she personally is likely to suffer inhuman or degrading treatment. In
the early decision of X against the Federal Republic of Germany (1962), however,
the Commission implied that a petition is sufficient to state a violation of
Article 3 if it alleges that the receiving state is a systematic violator of
human rights. 95 This raises the possibility that any deportation or extradi-
tion to certain countries would be a violation of Article 3 by the expelling
state. If this were the case, it would reduce the applicant's burden of proof
greatly, since he or she would have to allege only generally inimical prac-
tices, rather than the details of the probability that, because of personal
characteristics, he or she would be harmed.
Such an approach would be consistent with the Commission's purpose
in applying Article 3 to cases of deportation and extradition, namely, the
prevention of inhuman or degrading treatment after expulsion. It is possi-
LEGAL REMEDIES FOR REFUGEES 487
ble, and indeed probable, that deportation to a nation that systematically
violates human rights would expose the applicant to a sufficient likelihood
of harm to invoke Article 3. The most obvious drawback to this approach
lies in the difficulty of categorizing states. As relatively few states outside
of the Convention parties guarantee human rights on the same scale as the
Convention, categorization may become an exercise in weighing relative
suppressions of rights. This approach would also impinge significantly,
perhaps unduly, on the policy independence of Convention parties. The
finding that any deportation to a particular country constitutes a violation
of Article 3 would amount to a blanket prohibition of deportation to that
country; contracting parties might well resent such a broad usurpation of
their sovereign power to control the entry and exit of aliens, even though
they are willing to concede this power to the Commission in individual
cases. Finally, labeling a country as a human rights violator might cause
severe problems in the foreign relations of the member states. The state so
labeled would doubtless protest, and the moral judgment attached to the
label could be a source of anger and tension interfering in bilateral relations
between the offender and any of the contracting parties.
Acts by nonofficial parties in the receiving country present another
question on the scope of the doctrine of nondeportation. In X v/Federal
Republic of Germany (1975), 96 the applicant, a Lebanese Moslem, alleged that
he had been a terrorist in the Black September group, but that he had
abandoned the organization before entering West Germany. -After his
conviction for illegal entry and other criminal offenses, the applicant was
ordered to leave by the German Government. The applicant claimed that
if he were deported to Lebanon, he would be killed by the Palestinian
Liberation Organization for his refusal to rejoin Black September. Due to
substantial inconsistencies in the facts alleged by the applicant in his
petition, the Commission declined to decide whether such a threat fell
under Article 3 and the nondeportation doctrine. 97 The argument ad-
vanced by the applicant has some merit. The possible actions of an autono-
mous group could well present a definite threat to a returnee. If the
applicant could prove the probability of the harm fully, the same argu-
ments stand as if the receiving state itself were the threat. If the Commis-
sion required solid proof of individual danger, the admission of a claim on
such facts would be consistent with its rationale in prior cases.
CONCLUSION: TOWARD A GENERAL RIGHT OF ASYLUM?
The ultimate question on the scope of the nondeportation doctrine is
whether it might be expanded into, or be a precursor of, a right of entry-
asylum at the border. The European Convention contains no such right,
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and the right of nondeportation under Article 3 as developed by the Com-
mission, diverges from what might be expected of a full-fledged right of
asylum. It can arise only in situations where an individual has already
entered the country in which he or she seeks asylum. The right depends
not on the conditions from which an individual has fled, but on the
anticipated treatment the individual will experience if returned to the
country of origin. The reprieve from deportation depends on the standard
of "inhuman or degrading" treatment, a standard which may not be entire-
ly coterminous with or as favorable toward applicants as the related stan-
dard of persecution that governs determinations of refugee status under
the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. 98
Despite its limitations, the doctrine of nondeportation represents a sig-
nificant step in the development of human rights law and in the illumina-
tion of a corner of the field of territorial asylum. Its significance as a
precursor of a right of asylum at the frontier is another matter, as a recent
case before the Commission demonstrates. In 3 East African Asians v. the
United Kingdom (1978), 99 the applicants were British protected persons who
had resided in three former British colonies in East Africa. They had been
harassed because of their Asian ethnicity, and two of them were finally
ordered to leave their countries. All three sought entry to the UK, which
refused to admit them. The applicants alleged that the British immigration
laws under which they were denied entry were racially discriminatory and
in violation of Article 3. The Commission concluded that the laws were not
discriminatory and that they did not subject the applicants to degrading
treatment. 100 Although these cases arguably are distinguishable from cases
under the deportation and extradition doctrine, since the applicants did not
allege that they would be in danger of inhuman or degrading treatment if
not allowed into the UK, the import of the Commission's opinion is clear.
It remains quite unwilling to interfere with the sovereign right of a state
to admit or refuse admission to whomever it will, at least so long as the
decision is not based on discriminatory grounds.
Traditionally, the grant of asylum has been purely a matter of national
prerogative. Over the last twenty years, the European Commission of
Human Rights has modified this rule. For those countries which are parties
to the European Convention on Human Rights, the doctrine of non-depor-
tation enunciated by the Commission has reduced the rights of states to
deport aliens and has increased the security of refugees in Western Europe.
It is certainly too soon to conclude that the cases discussed above mark
the beginning of a worldwide trend in international law toward an in-
dividual right of asylum. The system set up by the European Convention
on Human Rights is unique Moreover, the doctrine of non-deportation
itself has been applied only in special circumstances. The doctrine is
nonetheless a marked departure from traditional international law, and
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constitutes an advance in international efforts to protect the rights and
lives of refugees.
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